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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Brazil‟s growing status as a potential world power cannot
obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a
country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The
Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime
syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm
that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a
product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also
of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio‟s favela
slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the
State‟s control of parts of Rio territory.
As Brazil‟s soft power projection grows, it is seriously
challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime.
Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply
embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil‟s success
may yet further retrench the CV‟s activities. Culpability for
organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but
must also be shared among the willing consumers, among
whom can be found educated and elite members of society,
as well as the impoverished and desperate.
The Brazilian government needs a top-down response
addressing the schism between rich and poor. However,
Brazil‟s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a
bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled
elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil
must target reform across public health, housing, education
and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes,
Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio‟s wealthy will
still be able to revel in the city‟s beauty, albeit from behind
armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city‟s poor
will yield—either as victims or perpetrators—to the
desperate measures of organized crime.
1

BRAZIL: INEQUALITY AND CRIME
Beaches, beautiful bikini-clad girls and blue-water bays:
Brazil conjures an alluring cliché. But the brutal reality of
slums and AK-47-toting teenagers, clearly visible amidst the
luscious scenery, rarely intrudes upon the images that fuel so
many tourist daydreams.
Chaos and crime alongside beauty and wealth may not be the
stuff of tourists‟ fantasies but it is the waking nightmare Rio
de Janeiro residents have lived with since the 1980s.A walk
through the metropolis yields the sight of myriad wall murals
and graffiti bearing the initials CV—the calling card of the
Comando Vermelho (Red Command), Rio‟s largest and most
powerful organized crime faction. The gang‟s rapid rise to
power through the city‟s prisons and favela slums can be
plotted against the state‟s emergence from parlous “thirdworld” status to its current bid for great power recognition.
In both stories, a dualistic, omnipresent tension between
success and failure features prominently.
In Rio, that dualism‟s presence exists at eye-level: conclaves
of million-dollar abodes and notable billionaires—Eike
Batista, the eighth richest man in the world, is just one of the
30 Forbes-ranked examples1—stand in remarkably sharp
contrast to the quilt of over 1000 favelas laid like a blanket
over the city‟s uniquely mountainous and forested
topography. The physical distance between rich and poor can
often be measured in meters, while the distance in dollars
looks like one of the planet‟s greatest chasms. Indeed, Brazil
consistently registers among the world‟s highest GINI index

1

“The World‟s Billionaires,” Forbes.com, (9 March
2011),http://www.forbes.com/wealth/billionaires/list (accessed 1 April,
2011).
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of income equality coefficients2. While the number has
improved in the last few years thanks to Brazil‟s economic
growth (down to 54.0 in 2010 from 55.0 in 20093) it is still
comparable to such locales as Haiti at 59.5 and South Africa
at 57.84—and this prosperity gap serves as one of the
principal drivers of the urban warfare that organized crime
has unleashed.
The iniquities of Brazil‟s megacities, however, have not been
barriers in the country‟s projection of its newfound soft
power. The proof lies in Rio being accorded the privilege of
hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer
Olympics. As the city and the State comes to grips with
controlling the CV and violent conflict in Rio‟s streets in
preparation for the games‟ looming deadlines, the intricacies
of the task raise a serious question: Does economic
improvement naturally herald the inevitable demise of the
CV, or do systemic internalities pose bigger obstacles in
controlling organized crime than fiscal ascendance can
surmount?

2

Gini-coefficient of inequality: This is the most commonly used measure
of inequality. The coefficient varies between 0, which reflects complete
equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person has all
the income or consumption, all others have none).
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVER
TY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:14895
6~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html.
3
World Bank. “Brazil Country Brief,” World Bank Online,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEX
T/BRAZILEXTN/0,,menuPK:322351~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~th
eSitePK:322341,00.html (accessed 1 April, 2011).
4
United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report
2009. United Nations Development Program,
2009,http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/161.html (accessed 1 March,
2011).
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DRUGS AND ARMS TRAFFICKING
Multiple domestic factors coalesced within Brazil to plough
a furrow in which home-grown gangs like the CV could
germinate and flourish. But external factors provided the
crucial profit incentive. During the late 1970s, the formation
of Colombia‟s Medellin and Cali cocaine cartels generated a
logistical need to traffic goods to consumers in the United
States (US) and Europe. Rio, with its ports and airports, was
an obvious target for Colombia‟s drug lords. Producers in
Brazil‟s bordering countries of Peru and land-locked Bolivia
also saw a natural partner in their eastern neighbor. As
cocaine prices and demand grew in the 1980s, so did the
importance of Rio as a pivotal distribution point for cocagrowing nations. Consequently, the city saw an
unprecedented increase in violence.
According to a UNESCO report, homicides in Rio rose
sharply in 1980—even as the city experienced a decrease in
population growth of 2 percent. Violent deaths accounted for
50 percent of youth mortality in Rio and by 2003, that
percentage reached 75 percent.5 Official crime statistics for
metropolitan Rio indicate the 1982 homicide rate by
handguns stood at 20.5/100,000, tripling to its all-time peak
of 61.2/100,000 by 1989. Since then, the rate has stabilized
at around 50/100,000.6
To arm themselves, drug gangs like the CV looked to
neighboring countries for weapons. The criminal paradise of
the so-called Tri-Border Area (TBA), the heavily forested
and poorly patrolled nexus where Brazil meets Paraguay and
5

UNESCO. Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: The Case of
Rio, (Rio de Janeiro: UNESCO, 2007), 2-4,
http://www.ims.uerj.br/nupevi/thecaseofrio.pdf (accessed 1 March,
2011).
6
http://www.ims.uerj.br/nupevi/thecaseofrio.pdf.
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Argentina, has served as a critical transit point. Gangsters
typically retrieve weapons and drugs along Paraguay‟s
porous 800-kilometer undefined border with Brazil.7 The
Weapons Trafficking Map produced by Viva Rio, a Brazilian
non-government organization formed to address many of
Rio‟s urban problems, estimates that 7.6 million illegal
weapons (handguns and machine guns) remain in circulation,
16.4 percent of which are in use in Rio.8
Eradication efforts in the last decade reduced Colombia‟s
role as a cocaine producer by as much as 57 percent,9though
drug cartels from Mexico, as well as Peruvian and Bolivian
production, have partially filled that vacuum.10While this net
drop in cocaine-based trafficking dovetails with decreased
cocaine use internationally, organized crime factions in Rio
have safeguarded their position by diversifying into new
products and pushing their wares domestically:
Criminal organizations that have traditionally
been involved in drug trafficking at the
international level have also started to
engage in drug trafficking and other forms of
drug-related crime at the national level. The
availability of a greater variety of illicit drugs
and the increase in the abuse of those drugs,
7

Rex Hudson. “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border
Area (TBA) of South America.” Library of Congress Federal Research
Division, July 2003, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdffiles/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf (accessed 1 March 2011).
8
“Maior parte de armas e drogas entram no Pais por 18 pontos,” O
Jornal Online, 19 January, 2011
http://www.ojornalweb.com/2011/01/09/maior-parte-de-armas-e-drogasentram-no-pais-por-18-pontos/ (accessed 1 March, 2011).
9
U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Colombia,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm (accessed 1 March, 2011).
10
International Narcotics Control Board. Annual Report 2010. Vienna:
International Narcotics Control Board, 2010: p.72.
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in particular among youth, indicate that the
illicit drug market continues to change.11
Thus, even a significant decrease in external activity has not
been sufficient enough to have an analogous impact on the
city‟s gangs. This conclusion prompts a closer look at the CV
itself.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF THE COMANDO
VERMELHO (CV)
Investigative journalist, Carlos Amorim, a Rio native and the
most prolific expert on the CV, asserts the gang‟s origins as
the product of Brazil‟s military dictatorship. Amorim has
written a trilogy on organized crime in Brazil, the first being
Comando Vermelho: A Historia Secreta do Crime
Organizado (Comando Vermelho: The Secret History of
Organized Crime). Amorim argues that the CV is the result
of Brazil‟s dictatorship in the late 1970s. The vacuum
created by the State‟s neglect of proper governance,
combined with an oligarchic strain of corrupt capitalism,
relegated the masses, especially the poor of the favelas, to
the periphery. As a result, founding members of the CV
wound up appropriating the methods of educated leftist
armed rebels—from revolutionary jargon to urban guerrilla
tactics to rigid line of command—to great success. In doing
so, the group amassed such significant power that they
effectively posed (and still do) a direct challenge to the
State.12
From 1964 to 1985, Brazilians lived under what‟s known in
Portuguese as the “years of lead.” When the Army marched
11

International Narcotics Control Board. Annual Report 2010. p.72.
Carlos Amorim, Comando Vermelho: A Historia Secreta do Crime
Organizado. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1993.
12
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into Rio in 1964 to depose the left-wing president, João
Goulart, they instituted a 21-year crackdown on free speech,
freedom of the press, social movements and any forms of
protest, often torturing anyone who dissented (including
current Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff).During this
period, in the Cândido Mendes Prison on Ilha Grande (“Big
Island”), situated in one of Rio‟s many bays, petty thieves
and bank robbers were being put in the same filthy, humid,
overcrowded cells as the university-educated antigovernment protesters (several of whom were from middle
and upper class families)sent to prison under the
dictatorship‟s notorious National Security Law of 1967 (Lei
de Segurança Nacional or LSN). The politicized elites
coached the common criminals—most of whom were poor
and simply resorting to crime for survival—in the language,
logistics and command structure of revolution.
The disadvantaged were taught wide range of practical
terrorist skills, from bomb-making to tunnel-building. These
prisoners, organized among six main phalanxes that
represented sections of the institution, focused their newlytrained energies variously on denouncing the state jail
apparatus and their poor living conditions. By 1979, a war
for hegemony broke out among the phalanxes. The most
brutal and powerful group, comprised of members from
northern Rio‟s favelas, first established its leadership over
the jail, and then set its sights beyond prison. Thus the CV
was born.
As key members of this group escaped from their island
penitentiary back to Rio‟s streets (while those still within
used visiting peers and family members to convey orders to
their cohorts on the outside), their focus turned to the
exploding trade of cocaine. The money from assisting
external organized crime syndicates could be used to survive
and finance freeing their still-imprisoned associates. The CV
7

also justified using the money as financing for “a permanent
fight against repression and abuses.” Indeed, the gang‟s
slogan became (and still is) “Peace, Justice and Liberty.”13
Tamara Makarenko, whose Crime-Terror Continuum tracks
the ideological agenda of terrorist groups against the profitseeking one of organized crime, echoes some of the narrative
points that Amorim illuminates in his history of the
CV.14However, the CV(and other Brazilian gangs like São
Paulo‟s PCC [Primeiro Comando do Capital]), defies the
typical path Makarenko cites; in most cases, movement
along a Crime-Terror continuum sees terrorist groups
shifting towards the use of crime, rather than the other way
around. In cases where criminal groups use political tactics
to achieve their aims, she writes:
It is important to clarify that their intention
was not to change the status quo, but merely
to secure their operational environment. As
Dishman notes, criminal organisations use
„selective and calibrated violence to destroy
competitors or threaten counternarcotic
authorities. As such, a violent attack directed
by
a
TCO
[transnational
criminal
organisation] is intended for a specific „anticonstituency‟ rather than a national or
international audience, and it is not laced
with political rhetoric‟ [17].”15
Others, however, counter Makarenko‟s notion by pointing to
the CV‟s routine adherence to political rhetoric regardless of
13

Amorim, 23.
Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the
Interplay Between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,”
Global Crime Vol. 6, No.1 (February 2004), 129-145.
15
Makarenko, 133.
14
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the effect on its own illicit activities. Anthropologist James
Holston suggests that the CV employs a perverse and
uniquely Brazilian use of the political language of
democracy—one which has become an evaluative standard
to explain their murderous violence. Considering the
revolutionary prison origins of the CV and the equally
abusive, corrupt and violent tactics of the Brazilian state and
its security apparatus, this explanation appears to offer a
more illuminating view than Makarenko‟s in explaining
Rio‟s situation. Holston asserts:
Brazil‟s democracy has thus far produced a
dangerous, hybrid space of citizenship as a
sphere of social change in which the legal
and the illegal, legitimate and criminal, just
and unjust, and civil and uncivil claim the
same moral ground of citizen rights and
respect by way of contradictory social
practices, a hybrid space in which the
rationalities of crime, revolution, democratic
citizenship, and law combine.16
Holston cites a proclamation that the CV issued to the city of
Rio in 2003 imposing a shut-down of commerce in the name
of justice17—a peculiar demand for an organized crime
faction. The CV justifies its practice of crime and terror with
the rationale of citizenship, frequently using public talk of
rights and staging violent protests when prison rebellions
break out. According to Holston, this is due to the
differentiated, unofficially dual tracked citizenship that has
16

James Holston, “Dangerous Spaces of Citizenship: Gang Talk, Rights
Talk and Rule of Law in Brazil,” (Panel paper, University of California,
Berkeley, 2008) 6,
http://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/projects/Democracy&Development/pap
ers/Panel%20IV_Holston_.pdf (accessed 1 March, 2011).
17
Holston, 5.
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arisen in Brazil as a legacy of its colonial, oligarchic and
dictatorship-flecked history. The poor citizens are neglected
by the State through the denial of basic services and legal
justice. The State sees human rights for criminals, who
almost always come from the poor classes, as “privileges for
bandits.” Elites (especially at the levels of government and
law enforcement), on the other hand, talk of protection of the
rights of the poor while they negate these same rights
through corruption, violent interdiction and ignoring
conditions in places like favelas and prisons, leaving poor
citizens to essentially fend for themselves. This contradictory
attitude towards citizens‟ rights (highlighted by the visible
income inequality that defines the country) serves as a key
factor in the CV‟s continued use of rhetoric—and an obstacle
in the government‟s attempt to effectively eradicate the CV
and organized crime activities due to the mistrust of the state
it fosters.
THE CURRENT COMANDO VERMELHO
Like the Mafia, the CV entrench themselves within their
communities by combining terror and public works. The
gang‟s rule is absolute within the favelas they “own.”Any
infraction will be met with death. However, the cartel also
provides favela residents with such basic necessities as
cooking fuel, electricity, informal transport and medicine—
albeit at rent-seeking prices higher than market rates.
Consequently, gangs and residents share a complex
interdependency. Within its territories, the CV is the State.
Unlike the Mafia, however, the CV lacks a hierarchical
structure—a function of its decentralized territorial control
over the vast, interconnected hillside networks of favelas.
The CV‟s drug trafficking operations consist of a horizontal
arrangement by which allied favelas provide guns or drugs as
needed, notes Alba Zaluar, director of the NUPEV Violence
10

Research Center at the University of Rio de Janeiro and an
author of a 2007 UNESCO report on Rio. Horizontal
reciprocity defines the interactions among allied crews as
they join the geographically defined regions together into
larger networks.18 This poses the greatest logistical difficulty
for law enforcement in curbing the gang‟s operations, since
this requires house-to-house counter-insurgency operations
over mountainous terrain.
The growing cultural economy around the CV further
exacerbates eradication difficulties. Within Rio, the gang is a
verifiable brand, its red and white logo as identifiable as a
soccer team‟s colors. But its commercial identity expands
well beyond Brazil‟s borders: fans of worldwide videogame
phenomenon Grand Theft Auto can play as CV members and
watch realistic fight modules over YouTube; and last year, a
docu-drama of the gang‟s history, 400 Contra Um (“Four
Hundred Against One”), was released to critical and popular
acclaim. But the CV‟s foray into the entertainment business
may be most pernicious: the CV releases recordings of
popular Rio “funk” musicians, the tunes played at CV bailes
funk (“funk balls”) all over the city. The parties not only
generate income from punters clamoring to get in, they also
serve as clandestine gang recruiting environments and places
of exchange for drugs and guns.
As Amorim points out, the gang has morphed with the times:
The trafficking of drugs—and the CV itself—
is no longer confined to the favelas. It has
now reached the middle classes outside of the
slums, with ample support from mobile
telephony and the Internet. The drug business
now includes trafficking of synthetic drugs,
18

UNESCO, Global Report on Human Settlements 2007: The Case of
Rio, Rio de Janeiro: UNESCO, 2007, 13-14.
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amply distributed through schools and places
where young people hang out. In addition,
there is information that the three principal
organized crime gangs of Rio (CV, Terceiro
Comando Puro [TCP] and Amigos dos
Amigos [ADA]) have unified in a commercial
pact to dominate more than 70% of the total
drug distribution.”19
Indeed, the drug business of the CV has recently expanded to
include the sale of a powerful and deadly new product
known in Portuguese as “oxi.” The CV, in an agreement with
the PCC, took over control of crack distribution since the
drug‟s first appearance in Brazil in 1989.In the last five
years, in search of new drugs similar to crack that could be
cheaply synthesized from the leftovers of Bolivian and
Peruvian cocaine production, the CV has been connected
with the appearance of the crack-like oxi (short for
“oxidado,” meaning rusted or oxidized), which consists of
the base coca paste used for cocaine production, mixed with
kerosene or gasoline, acetone and battery fluid. An
extremely addictive substance, oxi is considered four times
more lethal than crack, with users typically dying within a
year due to the drug‟s toxicity.20 The drug‟s distribution has
spread alarmingly quickly within the last six years, at first
among the poor and jobless of Brazil‟s Northeastern and
Amazonian regions and within the last year, to Brazil‟s
mega-cities. In May 2011, police officers made the first oxi
bust in Rio de Janeiro state, in the middle-class suburb of
Niterói (25 minutes from downtown Rio). CV-connected
traffickers were found within a local fishing community with
19

Amorim, Carlos, e-mail Interview by Regina Joseph, 13 April 2011,
New York, NY.
20
Patricia Maresch, “Oxi: New Drug Terrifies Brazil,” Rio Times Online,
26 April, 2011, http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/front-page/oxinew-drug-terrifies-brazil/ (accessed 26 April, 2011).
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caches of oxi, cocaine, crack, cannabis and automatic
weapons.21Driving the drug‟s fast rise are oxi‟s addictive
properties and its price—BR$2 for a rock of oxi, versus
BR$8 for a rock of crack.22
Despite such diversification however, the CV no longer
dominates as much territory as it once did. Key CV leaders
are either dead or in prison and most members now are
thuggish teenagers, unlike the more mature members of
earlier years. More significantly, favela-dwelling inactive
and active members of law enforcement and fire departments
formed heavily-armed vigilante militias determined to drive
out gangs from their communities. The militia‟s firepower
outmatched that of the gangs. After more than five years of
brutal counter-insurgencies—as state authorities looked
away—these paramilitary brigades achieved a measure of
success (and profit, as militias took over the rent-seeking
racketeering of the gang cells they vanquished). According
to a 2009 study by the University of Rio de Janeiro‟s
Violence Research center (Nupev-Uerj), militias went from
controlling 10 percent of the city‟s most violent favelas in
2005 to 36 percent by 2008. By 2009, 41.5 percent of the
1000 favelas in Rio were controlled by militias, versus 40
percent controlled by the CV.23

21

Gustavo Carvalho and Gabriel Saboia, “Polícia apreende 'oxi' em
Niterói,” Jornal O São Gonçalo Online, 17 May, 2011
http://www.osaogoncalo.com.br/site/pol%C3%ADcia/2011/5/19/26327/p
ol%C3%ADcia+apreende+oxi+em+niter%C3%B3i (accessed 17 May,
2011).
22
http://www.osaogoncalo.com.br/site/pol%C3%ADcia/2011/5/19/26327
/pol%C3%ADcia+apreende+oxi+em+niter%C3%B3i.
23
Luiz AgostoGollo, “Vigilante Groups Trump Drug Gangs and Become
Rio‟s New Authority.” Brazil Online, 11 November 2009,
http://www.brazzil.com/home-mainmenu-1/200-january-2009/10295vigilante-groups-in-brazil-trump-drug-gangs-and-become-rios-newauthority.html (accessed 1 March, 2011).
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THE LIMITS OF CONTROL: CAN STATE ECONOMIC
SUCCESS OVERCOME ORGANIZED CRIME?
State authorities like Rio de Janeiro‟s governor Sergio
Cabral, eager to position decreases in the CV‟s authority and
activity as a function of improved, enlightened enforcement
tactics, point to new approaches like that of the UPPs (the
Pacification Police Units)—a semi-permanent favela force
whose role is to integrate into the communities and engender
trust in the police by working and living alongside the poor.
Kevlar body-armor-wearing officers snuggle up to babies in
makeshift daycare centers; teach unemployed youth
everything from guitar to jiu jitsu; and attempt to create an
alternative to the perception of police forces as corrupt,
abusive and purveyors of as much terror to favela residents
as organized crime gangs.24
Politicians crow over such statistics as the declining
homicide rate in Rio. In March 2010, murders were down by
16 percent compared to the same month the year before.25
On an indirect level, state officials ascribe improvements and
new strategies to Brazil‟s economic growth; its victory in the
decades-long struggle to control hyperinflation; and the
success of programs like the conditional cash transfer
program known as Bolsa Familia—a measure made famous
by former President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva and
responsible for lifting more than 20 million people out of
poverty. In fact, the Lula administration of 2003-2010 saw
an overall 6 percent decrease in violent crime, which
politicians correlate with income distribution and growth
24

“Drug Violence Drops in Rio as New Policing Techniques
Introduced.” Latin America News Dispatch Online, 20 May 2010,
http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-dejaneiro-as-new-policing-techniques-introduced/ (accessed 2 March
2011).
25
http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-dejaneiro-as-new-policing-techniques-introduced/.
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plans.26As a way of justifying the rationale behind according
Rio prestigious sporting events like the World Cup and the
Olympics, politicians feel enormous pressure to insist Brazil
and Rio are on the right track. And in absolute terms, the
politicians are right: inequality, the deadly driver behind the
rise of organized crime groups like the CV, is not growing.27
Continuity in Brazil‟s economic ascendance rests to some
degree on improvement and maintenance of security.
Currently, foreign investors view Brazil favorably, but the
crime and carnage of Brazil‟s drug wars can still hurt the
country economically. Organized crime may yet intrude on
the growth of Brazil‟s burgeoning “virtuous circle, in which
security brings investment, which in turn brings resources
that can be used to continue improving security,” says
Rodrigo Abreu, President of Cisco Brazil. “Everything
points in the right direction. But a footnote always appears:
make sure to pay attention to security risks.” 28
To this end, Rio is undertaking “pacifications” of favelas on
a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis, using a special
counter-insurgency SWAT force, the BOPE, to crush the CV
and its ilk. In 2010, attempts to drive out the CV from a few
of the most violent favelas ended with casualties among
criminals, police and innocent bystanders. While many
residents appear grateful for the removal of gang activity,
just as many cite the aggression of the securing officers.29
26

http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-dejaneiro-as-new-policing-techniques-introduced/.
27
, “A Crisis Fluke: Brazil‟s Shrinking Wealth Gap.” Newsweek Online,
13 August 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/wealthof-nations/2009/08/13/a-crisis-fluke-brazil-s-shrinking-wealth-gap.html
(accessed, 2 March, 2011).
28
http://latindispatch.com/2010/05/20/drug-violence-drops-in-rio-dejaneiro-as-new-policing-techniques-introduced/.
29
Christian Parenti, “Retaking Rio.” The Nation, 12 May 2010,
http://www.thenation.com/article/retaking-rio (accessed 2 March, 2011).
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Furthermore, given the 2014 World Cup deadline, 19
“pacified” favelas out of 1000 looks positively Sisyphean.
As these actions against the CV continue, the nexus between
crime and the State, and the extent of their corrupt
relationship, grows starker: a2010 anti-police corruption
sting known as Operation Guillotine indicted 45 dirty cops,
including Allan Turnowski, the chief of Rio‟s civil police
force, for trafficking, bribes and tip-offs to gangsters. Says
Amorim:
The UPPs, in the form of a community police
force, are an interesting concept. But it‟s too
early to evaluate the results. Without a reform
of the police apparatus, it could all go badly
wrong. Hundreds of cases of abuse, violence,
and theft from people who live in the occupied
favelas exist. In the Complexo do Alemão
alone [a favela pacified in 2010], 52 law
enforcement agents were apprehended for
shaking down the poorest residents.
Subsequently, the investigation of the federal
forces, [OperationGuillotine], took down
officers at the highest levels of Rio‟s police,
accusing them of selling privileged
information to criminals. I hope the UPPs
transform into a political order of security,
and don‟t become merely “cleaners” of Rio
for the World Cup and the Olympics.30
Much skepticism still remains over the state‟s one-size-fitsall approach of massive firepower to counter organized
crime firepower. And has it really decreased numbers among
members of the CV, especially as they increase focus on
30

Amorim, Carlos, e-mail interview by Regina Joseph, 13 April 2011,
New York, NY.
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domestic drug sales and operations beyond the slums?
Amorim is dubious:
Actually, it‟s difficult to account for
estimations of the size of criminal factions,
especially the CV. In the past few years,
they‟ve been made somewhat scarcer by the
rise of UPP forces, which occupy 19 of the
more than 1000 favelas of greater Rio, and
the militias, paramilitary groups connected to
the police and who are present in more than
100 favela communities. Apart from this,
however, the state security ministries claim
that the CV still controls the majority of drug
trafficking in Rio and even controls
trafficking connections to other states
(especially São Paulo, which is associated
with the PCC) and to other countries. When
the police and armed forces invaded the
Morro do Alemão [a favela pacified in 2010],
the newspaper Folha de São Paulo published
a Federal Police (the FBI of Brazil) memo
noting that the CV controls the importation
and distribution of 90 metric tons of cocaine
and 400 metric tons of marijuana each year—
a business worth 800 million reais (over
USD$500 million). In my first book in 1993, I
estimated the CV to be composed of around
30,000 members, both within the prisons and
in the 630 favelas that the organization
occupied at that time. Today it is impossible
to determine the real number of members
now.31

31

Amorim, Carlos, e-mail interview by Regina Joseph, 13 April 2011,
New York, NY.

17

So Rio‟s security strategy appears insufficient as the singular
requirement for eradicating the likes of the CV. To provide
poor citizens with few options an alternative to organized
crime, a balance must be struck by combining a reformed
security approach; income inequality reduction measures; the
vital necessities of education, public health and housing
reform; with sustainable employment opportunities. The
CV‟s lure remains powerful in Rio, despite changes in drug
consumption and trafficking trends.
CONCLUSION
Despite economic ascendance, Brazil remains essentially two
states in one: a prosperous Belgium-scaled State alongside a
destitute, India-sized nation.32 Organized crime and the
Comando Vermelho have found an optimal growth medium
in Brazil‟s version of “the first and the developing worlds
existing side by side,” as author Misha Glenny writes. “The
first world provides good roads…airports…and an efficient
banking system…The developing world accounts for the low
tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of
corruption throughout the administration, and…land and sea
borders that have more holes than a second-hand
dartboard.”33
Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply
embedded organization like the CV, despite statistical data
pointing to decreases in violence. In fact, Brazil‟s success
may yet further retrench the CV‟s activities for the reasons
identified in the preceding paragraph. In addition, as
Brazil‟s middle and upper-middle classes expand and
increase their participation and consumption within the
32
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transnational drug trade propelled by the CV, the more
difficult it becomes to unravel. Culpability for organized
crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also
be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can
be found educated and elite members of society as well as
the impoverished and desperate.
Brazil‟s systemic social and political failures pose the
biggest challenge to eliminating organized crime. Politicians
are trying to build a slick new state edifice on the rotting
foundation timbers of corruption and historic neglect of the
poor‟s interests. Until government coordinates a top-down
response addressing the schism between rich and poor and
targeting reform across public health and housing, education
and above all, law enforcement, Brazil will remain a twotrack democracy. Rio‟s wealthy will still be able to revel in
the city‟s beauty, albeit from behind armored cars and
fortified mansions, while the city‟s poor will yield—either as
victims or perpetrators—to the desperate measures of
organized crime.
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